Authors
Itay Tsabary, Ittay Eyal
Publication date
2018/10/15
Book
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages
713-728
Description
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As incentive for participation, miners receive newly minted currency and transaction fees paid by transaction creators. Blockchain bandwidth limits lead users to pay increasing fees in order to prioritize their transactions. However, most prior work focused on models where fees are negligible. In a notable exception, Carlsten et al. [17] postulated that if incentives come only from fees then a mining gap would form~--- miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient. In this work, we analyze cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards. To study when gaps form, we analyze the system as a game we call the gap …
Total citations
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Scholar articles
I Tsabary, I Eyal - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC conference on …, 2018