Authors
Joshua Lind, Christian Priebe, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O’Keeffe, Pierre-Louis Aublin, Florian Kelbert, Tobias Reiher, David Goltzsche, David Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Christof Fetzer, Peter Pietzuch
Publication date
2017
Journal
2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17), Santa Clara, CA
Description
Trusted execution support in modern CPUs, as offered by Intel SGX enclaves, can protect applications in untrusted environments. While prior work has shown that legacy applications can run in their entirety inside enclaves, this results in a large trusted computing base (TCB). Instead, we explore an approach in which we partition an application and use an enclave to protect only security-sensitive data and functions, thus obtaining a smaller TCB.
Scholar articles
J Lind, C Priebe, D Muthukumaran, D O'Keeffe… - 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX …, 2017
J Lind, C Priebe, D Muthukumaran - Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical …