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Kira Goldner
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Cited by
Year
Simple Mechanisms for Utility Maximization: Approximating Welfare in the IID Unit-Demand Setting
K Goldner, T Lundy
arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12340, 2024
12024
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
A Eden, M Feldman, K Goldner, S Mauras, D Mohan
2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2023
12023
Private interdependent valuations
A Eden, K Goldner, S Zheng
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2022
92022
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization
Y Cai, K Goldner, S Ma, M Zhao
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021
112021
Report on YoungEC 19
K Goldner
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (1), 37-40, 2020
2020
Non-adaptive matroid prophet inequalities
S Chawla, K Goldner, AR Karlin, JB Miller
arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.09406, 2020
52020
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
N Devanur, K Goldner, R Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 193-256, 2020
152020
When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase
M Essaidi, K Goldner, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.06326, 2020
32020
Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition
K Goldner, N Immorlica, B Lucier
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020), 15 …, 2020
112020
Bulow-klemperer-style results for welfare maximization in two-sided markets
M Babaioff, K Goldner, YA Gonczarowski
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020
202020
Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue
A Eden, M Feldman, A Fiat, K Goldner, AR Karlin
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 19-20, 2019
192019
Simple and approximately optimal pricing for proportional complementarities
Y Cai, NR Devanur, K Goldner, RP McAfee
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 239-240, 2019
32019
Mechanism Design for a Complex World: Rethinking Standard Assumptions
K Goldner
University of Washington, 2019
2019
A report on the workshop on mechanism design for social good
R Abebe, K Goldner
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 16 (2), 2-11, 2019
62019
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
K GOLDNER, AR KARLIN
2019
Mechanism design for social good
R Abebe, K Goldner
AI Matters 4 (3), 27-34, 2018
552018
The Menu Size of Precise and Approximate Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
K Goldner, YA Gonczarowski
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 706-706, 2018
22018
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
A Eden, M Feldman, A Fiat, K Goldner
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 369, 2018
262018
Revenue maximization with an uncertainty-averse buyer
S Chawla, K Goldner, JB Miller, E Pountourakis
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
92018
Mechanism Design for Social Good
K Goldner
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2017
2017
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Articles 1–20