Thinking about luck EJ Coffman Synthese 158, 385-398, 2007 | 138 | 2007 |
Uniqueness, evidence, and rationality N Ballantyne, EJ Coffman Philosophers 11, 2011 | 124 | 2011 |
Conciliationism and uniqueness N Ballantyne, EJ Coffman Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4), 657-670, 2012 | 87 | 2012 |
Luck: Its nature and significance for human knowledge and agency EJ Coffman Springer, 2015 | 58 | 2015 |
Warrant without truth? EJ Coffman Synthese 162, 173-194, 2008 | 58 | 2008 |
Does luck exclude control? EJ Coffman Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3), 499-504, 2009 | 43 | 2009 |
Deliberation and metaphysical freedom EJ Coffman, TA Warfield Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1), 25-44, 2005 | 38 | 2005 |
Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support D Howard-Snyder, EJ Coffman Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4), 535-564, 2006 | 26 | 2006 |
Lenient accounts of warranted assertability EJ Coffman | 18 | 2014 |
Misleading dispositions and the value of knowledge EJ Coffman Journal of Philosophical Research 35, 241-258, 2010 | 16 | 2010 |
IS JUSTIFIED BELIEF KNOWLEDGE? CRITICAL NOTICE OF JONATHAN SUTTON, WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION EJ Coffman Philosophical books 51 (1), 1-21, 2010 | 15 | 2010 |
Two claims about epistemic propriety EJ Coffman Synthese 181, 471-488, 2011 | 13 | 2011 |
Strokes of luck EJ Coffman The Philosophy of Luck, 27-58, 2015 | 12 | 2015 |
How (not) to attack the luck argument EJ Coffman Philosophical Explorations 13 (2), 157-166, 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
Defending Klein on closure and skepticism EJ Coffman Synthese 151, 257-272, 2006 | 8 | 2006 |
INCOMPATIBILIST COMMITMENT AND MORAL SELF-KNOWLEDGE EJ Coffman Philosophical Issues 26, 78-98, 2016 | 7 | 2016 |
Omniprescience and tough choices EJ Coffman Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3, 41-54, 2011 | 7 | 2011 |
Gettiered belief EJ Coffman | 6 | 2017 |
Hiddenness, evidence, and idolatry EJ Coffman, J Cervantez Evidence and Religious Belief, 95-113, 2011 | 6 | 2011 |
Does knowledge secure warrant to assert? EJ Coffman Philosophical studies 154, 285-300, 2011 | 5 | 2011 |