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Dylan Murray
Dylan Murray
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions
D Murray, E Nahmias
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2), 434-467, 2014
1682014
Experimental philosophy on free will: An error theory for incompatibilist intuitions
E Nahmias, D Murray
New waves in philosophy of action, 189-216, 2010
1322010
Judgment before principle: engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission
F Cushman, D Murray, S Gordon-McKeon, S Wharton, JD Greene
Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7 (8), 888-895, 2012
962012
God knows (but does God believe?)
D Murray, J Sytsma, J Livengood
Philosophical studies 166, 83-107, 2013
782013
Effects of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and moral responsibility
D Murray, T Lombrozo
Cognitive science 41 (2), 447-481, 2017
532017
Situationism, going mental, and modal akrasia
D Murray
Philosophical Studies 172, 711-736, 2015
102015
Experiments on Causal Exclusion
T Blanchard, D Murray, T Lombrozo
Mind & Language 37 (5), 1067-1089, 2021
72021
Risk and motivation: When the will is required to determine what to do
D Murray, L Buchak
Philosophers' Imprint 19, 2019
72019
Maggots are delicious, sunsets hideous: false, or do you just disagree? Data on truth relativism about judgments of personal taste and aesthetics
D Murray
Oxford Studies im Experimental Philosophy 3, 64-96, 2020
2020
Alfred Mele, Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will
D Murray
2018
Hijacking Reason: The Moral Ecology of Implicit Bias
D Murray
University of California, Berkeley, 2017
2017
When it’s wrong not to act: How the brain processes harmful omissions
F Cushman, S Gordon-McKeon, D Murray, S Wharton, J Greene
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Articles 1–12