Follow
Laura Doval
Laura Doval
Columbia University
Verified email at columbia.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Whether or not to open Pandora's box
L Doval
Journal of Economic Theory 175, 127-158, 2018
1082018
Sequential information Design
L Doval, JC Ely
91*2016
Mechanism design with limited commitment
L Doval, V Skreta
Econometrica 90 (4), 1463-1500, 2022
672022
A theory of stability in dynamic matching markets
L Doval
65*
Constrained information design
L Doval, V Skreta
Mathematics of Operations Research 49 (1), 78-106, 2024
59*2024
The value of time: Evidence from auctioned cab rides
N Buchholz, L Doval, J Kastl, F Matějka, T Salz
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
542020
Dynamically stable matching
L Doval
Theoretical Economics 17 (2), 687-724, 2022
392022
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
L Doval, V Skreta
arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.07456, 2019
242019
Persuasion and Welfare
L Doval, A Smolin
16*2023
On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets
L Doval, B Szentes
Available at SSRN 4097585, 2019
112019
Purchase history and product personalization
L Doval, V Skreta
arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.11504, 2021
92021
Supplement to “Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment”
L Doval, V Skreta
Econometrica 90 (4), 1499-1536, 2022
12022
Essays in Dynamic Matching and Experimentation
ML Doval
Northwestern University, 2016
12016
Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides
N Buchholz, L Doval, J Kastl, F Matejka, T Salz
2024
Managing Congestion in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Online Rentals
C Calsamiglia, L Doval, A Robinson-Cortés, M Shum
arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.14703, 2023
2023
The Core of Bayesian Persuasion
L Doval, R Eilat
arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.13849, 2023
2023
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
V Skreta, L Doval
CEPR Discussion Papers, 2019
2019
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–17