| Mechanism design with collusive supervision G Celik Journal of Economic Theory 144 (1), 69-95, 2009 | 123 | 2009 |
| Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation G Celik, O Yilankaya The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 9 (1), 24, 2009 | 51* | 2009 |
| Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism G Celik, M Peters Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2), 375-387, 2011 | 50 | 2011 |
| Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints G Celik Games and Economic Behavior 56 (1), 37-44, 2006 | 23 | 2006 |
| Counter marginalization of information rents: Implementing negatively correlated compensation schemes for colluding parties G Celik The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 3, 2008 | 14* | 2008 |
| Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design G Celik, M Peters Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 49 (1), 374-411, 2016 | 12 | 2016 |
| Implementation by gradual revelation G Celik The Rand Journal of Economics 46 (2), 271-296, 2015 | 10* | 2015 |
| On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers G Celik, S Sayan Review of Economic Design 12 (3), 209-227, 2008 | 8* | 2008 |
| Interested Experts: Do They Know More? G CELIK working paper University of British Columbia, 2003 | 8 | 2003 |
| Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation G Celik, O Yilankaya International Journal of Industrial Organization 54, 148-174, 2017 | 7 | 2017 |
| Aggregate information and organizational structures G Celik, D Shin, R Strausz The Journal of Industrial Economics 71 (1), 256-290, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
| Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider G Celik, D Shin, R Strausz The RAND Journal of Economics 52 (2), 314-333, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| Three essays on the informational aspects of untrustworthy experts, elusive agents and corrupt supervisors G Celik Northwestern University, 2002 | 3 | 2002 |
| Aggregate information and organizational structures G Celik, D Shin, R Strausz Discussion Paper, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
| Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Games in 2013 M Agranov, D Amdur, P Arena, R Argenziano, H Arnoldt, A Bassi, ... | | 2014 |
| Mechanism Design in the Presence of Supervision G Celik | | 2001 |
| Adjugé? Vendu! Comment le prix Nobel d'économie 2020 s' applique au monde réel G Celik | | |
| Organizational Structures and Manipulable Aggregate Information G Celik, D Shin, R Strausz | | |
