| Epistemology of disagreement: The good news D Christensen The Philosophical Review 116 (2), 187-217, 2007 | 1101 | 2007 |
| Putting logic in its place: Formal constraints on rational belief D Christensen Oxford University Press, 2004 | 543 | 2004 |
| Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy D Christensen Philosophy Compass 4 (5), 756-767, 2009 | 514 | 2009 |
| Higher‐Order Evidence1 D Christensen Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1), 185-215, 2010 | 474 | 2010 |
| Disagreement, question-begging and epistemic self-criticism D Christensen | 322 | 2011 |
| Clever bookies and coherent beliefs D Christensen The Philosophical Review 100 (2), 229-247, 1991 | 238 | 1991 |
| Measuring confirmation D Christensen The Journal of Philosophy 96 (9), 437-461, 1999 | 237 | 1999 |
| The epistemology of disagreement: New essays D Christensen, J Lackey OUP Oxford, 2013 | 226 | 2013 |
| Does Murphy’s law apply in epistemology? Self-doubt and rational ideals D Christensen Oxford studies in epistemology, 1, 2007 | 176 | 2007 |
| Conservatism in epistemology D Christensen Noûs 28 (1), 69-89, 1994 | 150 | 1994 |
| Dutch-book arguments depragmatized: Epistemic consistency for partial believers D Christensen The Journal of Philosophy 93 (9), 450-479, 1996 | 134 | 1996 |
| Epistemic modesty defended D Christensen | 126 | 2013 |
| Rational reflection D Christensen Philosophical Perspectives 24, 121-140, 2010 | 121 | 2010 |
| Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity1 D Christensen Noûs 50 (3), 584-603, 2016 | 109 | 2016 |
| Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the A Priori D Christensen, H Kornblith Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the …, 1997 | 64 | 1997 |
| Confirmational holism and bayesian epistemology D Christensen Philosophy of Science 59 (4), 540-557, 1992 | 64 | 1992 |
| Disagreement, drugs, etc.: From accuracy to akrasia D Christensen Episteme 13 (4), 397-422, 2016 | 62 | 2016 |
| Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality D Christensen The Philosophical Review 109 (3), 349-371, 2000 | 61 | 2000 |
| Preference-based arguments for probabilism D Christensen Philosophy of Science 68 (3), 356-376, 2001 | 52 | 2001 |
| Glymour on evidential relevance D Christensen Philosophy of Science 50 (3), 471-481, 1983 | 52 | 1983 |
