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Gunnar Björnsson
Gunnar Björnsson
Professor of Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University
Verified email at philosophy.su.se - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Metaethical contextualism defended
G Björnsson, S Finlay
Ethics 121 (1), 7-36, 2010
1712010
Recent work on motivational internalism
F Björklund, G Björnsson, J Eriksson, R Francén Olinder, C Strandberg
Analysis 72 (1), 124-137, 2012
1082012
Corporate crocodile tears? On the reactive attitudes of corporate agents
G Björnsson, K Hess
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94, 273–298, 2017
1002017
Essentially shared obligations
G Björnsson
Midwest studies in philosophy 38 (1), 103-120, 2014
812014
The explanatory component of moral responsibility
G Björnsson, K Persson
Noûs 46 (2), 326–354, 2012
792012
Argumentationsanalys
F Tersman, G Björnsson, U Kihlbom, A Ullholm
Natur och kultur, 1994
711994
Argumentationsanalys
G Björnsson, U Kihlbom, F Tersman, A Ullholm
Natur och Kultur, 1994
71*1994
Motivational internalism
G Björnsson, F Björklund, C Strandberg, J Eriksson, RF Olinder
Oxford University Press, USA, 2015
662015
Moral attitudes for non-cognitivists: Solving the specification problem
G Björnsson, T McPherson
Mind 123 (489), 1-38, 2014
592014
Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
G Björnsson
Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition, 146–162, 2017
562017
How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression
G Björnsson
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3), 327–344, 2002
502002
A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments
G Björnsson, K Persson
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3), 611–639, 2012
462012
Joint responsibility without individual control: Applying the explanation Hypothesis
G Björnsson
Moral Responsibility, 181-199, 2011
412011
Do ‘objectivist’features of moral discourse and thinking support moral objectivism?
G Björnsson
The Journal of ethics 16, 367-393, 2012
372012
Argumentationsanalys: färdigheter för kritiskt tänkande
G Björnsson, U Kihlbom, A Ullholm
Natur & kultur, 2009
372009
Explaining away epistemic skepticism about culpability
G Björnsson
Oxford studies in agency and responsibility 4, 141-162, 2017
362017
Traditional and experimental approaches to free will and moral responsibility
G Björnsson, D Pereboom
A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, 142-157, 2016
362016
Incompatibilism and ‘bypassed’agency
G Björnsson
Surrounding free will, 95-122, 2014
352014
Collective responsibility and collective obligations without collective moral agents
G Björnsson
The Routledge handbook of collective responsibility, 127-141, 2020
312020
Motivational internalism and folk intuitions
G Björnsson, J Eriksson, C Strandberg, RF Olinder, F Björklund
Philosophical Psychology 28 (5), 715-734, 2015
302015
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