What apparent reasons appear to be K Sylvan Philosophical Studies 172 (3), 587-606, 2015 | 98 | 2015 |
Veritism unswamped K Sylvan Mind 127 (506), 381-435, 2018 | 63 | 2018 |
Epistemic reasons i: Normativity K Sylvan Philosophy Compass 11 (7), 364-376, 2016 | 62 | 2016 |
Epistemic reasons II: basing K Sylvan Philosophy Compass 11 (7), 377-389, 2016 | 58 | 2016 |
The place of reasons in epistemology K Sylvan, E Sosa | 55 | 2018 |
An epistemic nonconsequentialism KL Sylvan Philosophical Review 129 (1), 1-51, 2020 | 51 | 2020 |
Knowledge as a non‐normative relation K Sylvan Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1), 190-222, 2018 | 47 | 2018 |
Prime time (for the basing relation) E Lord, K Sylvan Well-Founded Belief, 141-173, 2019 | 39 | 2019 |
Truth monism without teleology K Sylvan Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3), 161-169, 2012 | 29 | 2012 |
Suspension, higher-order evidence, and defeat E Lord, K Sylvan | 23 | 2021 |
Reasons: Wrong, right, normative, fundamental E Lord, K Sylvan J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 15, 43, 2019 | 20 | 2019 |
The illusion of discretion K Sylvan Synthese 193 (6), 1635-1665, 2016 | 17 | 2016 |
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons KL Sylvan Philosophical Studies 178 (10), 3129-3156, 2021 | 15 | 2021 |
How to be a redundant realist KL Sylvan Episteme 9 (3), 271-282, 2012 | 15 | 2012 |
Reliabilism without epistemic consequentialism KL Sylvan Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3), 525-555, 2020 | 13 | 2020 |
On the normativity of epistemic rationality KL Sylvan Rutgers The State University of New Jersey, School of Graduate Studies, 2014 | 13 | 2014 |
Responsibilism out of Character K Sylvan Epistemic Situationism, 135-57, 2017 | 11 | 2017 |
Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value? KL Sylvan Synthese 197 (12), 5335-5356, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
The place of reasons in epistemology E Sosa, K Sylvan The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology K Sylvan | 8 | 2014 |