Moral naturalism M Lutz | 79 | 2006 |
The ‘now what’problem for error theory M Lutz Philosophical Studies 171, 351-371, 2014 | 63 | 2014 |
What makes evolution a defeater? M Lutz Erkenntnis 83 (6), 1105-1126, 2018 | 50 | 2018 |
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment M Lutz Synthese 191, 1717-1740, 2014 | 25 | 2014 |
13.1. THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE M Lutz Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15 15, 284, 2020 | 18 | 2020 |
Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: Defending explanationist evidentialism M Lutz Synthese 197 (6), 2631-2647, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement M Lutz Philosophical Studies 177 (7), 1811-1828, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
The Case for Moral Skepticism M Lutz University of Southern California, 2015 | 4 | 2015 |
Moral Skepticism M Lutz, J Ross The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 484-498, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
In defense of deliberative indispensability M Lutz Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1), 118-135, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence M Lutz, S Finlay Ethics 125 (4), 1219-1225, 2015 | 2 | 2015 |
The Moral Closure Argument M Lutz J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 19, 80, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
Defusing the Counterinduction Parody M Lutz Philosophia 46 (2), 379-385, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
The Matched Explanations Theory of Knowledge M Lutz MS, 0 | 1 | |
Is Morality Real?: A Debate M Lutz, S Case Taylor & Francis, 2023 | | 2023 |
Naturalism and the Projectability Challenge M Lutz Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2), 31-46, 2022 | | 2022 |
Wouter Floris Kalf, Moral Error Theory M Lutz International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1), 71-77, 2019 | | 2019 |
Moral Error Theory, written by Wouter Floris Kalf M Lutz | | |
Skepticism about Basic Moral Knowledge M Lutz | | |