| Toward farsightedly stable international environmental agreements D Osmani, R Tol Journal of Public Economic Theory 11 (3), 455-492, 2009 | 70 | 2009 |
| The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries D Osmani, RSJ Tol Computational Economics 36, 93-119, 2010 | 52 | 2010 |
| A co-utility approach to the mesh economy: The crowd-based business model AN Turi, J Domingo-Ferrer, D Sanchez, D Osmani Review of Managerial Science 11, 411-442, 2017 | 45 | 2017 |
| The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection D Osmani, RSJ Tol FNU-82, 2005 | 10 | 2005 |
| Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two D Osmani, RSJ Tol Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University Working …, 2007 | 6 | 2007 |
| Co-utility: conciliating individual freedom and common good in the crowd based business model AN Turi, J Domingo-Ferrer, D Sánchez, D Osmani 2015 IEEE 12th International Conference on e-Business Engineering, 62-67, 2015 | 5 | 2015 |
| The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection D Osmani, R Tol Max Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling (IMPRS-ESM), Research …, 2006 | 5 | 2006 |
| Matrices with the consecutive ones property, interval graphs and their applications D Osmani Technische Universität Kaiserslautern, 2001 | 4 | 2001 |
| A note on computational aspects of farsighted coalitional stability D Osmani Univ., Forschungsstelle Nachhaltige Umweltentwicklung, 2011 | 3 | 2011 |
| A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint welfare maximization assumption D Osmani | 2 | 2009 |
| From d’aspremont to farsightedly stable international environmental agreements or what should we expect from game theory without side payments D Osmani, RSJ Tol FNU-149, 2009 | 2 | 2009 |
| Comparison of farsightedly stable climate coalitions in different time horizons D Osmani Environmental Modeling & Assessment 25 (1), 73-95, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements D Osmani, RSJ Tol Natural Resource Modeling 31 (2), e12154, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
| Valuing equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries in a Post-Kyoto world D Osmani Czech Economic Review 7 (02), 73-99, 2013 | 1 | 2013 |
| Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND D Osmani, RSJ Tol Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University Working …, 2008 | 1 | 2008 |
| A short note on joint welfare maximization assumption D Osmani, RSJ Tol The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics 6 (3), 22-39, 2008 | 1 | 2008 |
| Aspects of Coalitions for Environmental Protection Under Co-utility D Osmani Co-utility: Theory and Applications, 153-166, 2018 | | 2018 |
| The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework D Osmani Optimization 66 (12), 2193-2209, 2017 | | 2017 |
| Co-Utility: Conciliating Individual Freedom and Common Good in the Crowdbased Business Model DO Abeba Nigussie Turi, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, David Sánchez 2015 IEEE 12th International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2015 | | 2015 |
| The stability of international environmental agreements: modelling studies using a game-theoretic approach D Osmani LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2012 | | 2012 |
Richard S J TolUniversity of Sussex; Vrije U Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo; Payne Institute; Abu Dhabi UVerified email at sussex.ac.uk
