On committees of experts
B Visser, OH Swank - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007 - academic.oup.com
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of “the public.” Members of the committee
agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its …
agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its …
In defense of boards
…, OH Swank, B Visser - Journal of Economics & …, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board
of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be …
of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be …
Organizational communication structure and performance
B Visser - Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2000 - Elsevier
The effect of organizational communication structure on performance is studied using a project
selection framework in which heterogeneous, rational agents can reject or accept projects…
selection framework in which heterogeneous, rational agents can reject or accept projects…
Is transparency to no avail?
OH Swank, B Visser - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
Transparent decision‐making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working
of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that …
of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that …
A cognitive approach to organizational complexity
G Fioretti, B Visser - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
Organizational theory has construed complexity as an objective characteristic of either the
structure or the behaviour of an organization. We argue that to further our understanding it …
structure or the behaviour of an organization. We argue that to further our understanding it …
On the bad reputation of reputational concerns
G Suurmond, OH Swank, B Visser - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier
Can reputational concerns do any good? Economists have shown how they lead agents to
ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how they …
ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how they …
How committees of experts interact with the outside world: some theory, and evidence from the FOMC
J Swank, OH Swank, B Visser - Journal of the European …, 2008 - academic.oup.com
Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand
and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like …
and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like …
Learning from others? Decision rights, strategic communication, and reputational concerns
OH Swank, B Visser - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015 - aeaweb.org
We examine centralized versus decentralized decision making when experience of agents
is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has …
is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has …
[HTML][HTML] Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
V Karamychev, B Visser - International Journal of Game Theory, 2017 - Springer
We study Sender-optimal signaling equilibria with cheap talk and money-burning. Under
general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal all states, but always …
general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal all states, but always …
Complexity, robustness, and performance: trade-offs in organizational design
B Visser - 2002 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper analyses the relationship between organizational complexity (the degree of detail
of information necessary to correctly assign agents to positions), robustness (the relative …
of information necessary to correctly assign agents to positions), robustness (the relative …