The bank credit card market, containing 4,000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers, casually
appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition. Nevertheless, …

William Vickrey’s (1961) inquiry into auctions and “counterspeculation” marked the first serious
attempt by an economist to analyze the details of market rules and to design new rules to …

… Certainly, there are reasons why the seller may credibly withhold goods from the market for
long periods of time (Ausubel and Deneckere 1989). That said, the Coase Conjecture remains …

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient
outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, …

A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine
their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the …

Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity
auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items …

It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading.
In this article, an opposing efficiency argument is formalized. The model incorporates an …

This paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We
prove that, as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero, all seller payoffs …

This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous
commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The …

A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in
reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing …