On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
M Piccione, A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player)
withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies.
Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following ...
withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies.
Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following ...
Cited by 300 Related articles All 23 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.
A Rubinstein - Mathematical Social Sciences, 1995 - infona.pl
In this paper it is argued that extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single
player) with imperfect recall suffer from major ambiguities in the interpretation of information
sets and strategies. This indeterminacy allows for different kinds of analysis. We address ...
player) with imperfect recall suffer from major ambiguities in the interpretation of information
sets and strategies. This indeterminacy allows for different kinds of analysis. We address ...
The absent-minded driver's paradox: synthesis and responses
M Piccione, A Rubinstein - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
... Abstract. We classify the responses to our paper “On the Interpretation of Decision Problems
with Imperfect Recall” and address some of the points raised. References. References. 1; R.
Aumann, S. Hart, M. Perry; The Absent-Minded Driver. Games Econ. Behav., 20 (1997), pp. ...
with Imperfect Recall” and address some of the points raised. References. References. 1; R.
Aumann, S. Hart, M. Perry; The Absent-Minded Driver. Games Econ. Behav., 20 (1997), pp. ...
Cited by 50 Related articles All 15 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
P Jehiel - Journal of Economic theory, 2005 - Elsevier
... 23]; M. Piccione, A. Rubinstein; On the interpretation of decision problems with
imperfect recall. Games Econ. Behav., 20 (1997), pp. 3–24. ...
imperfect recall. Games Econ. Behav., 20 (1997), pp. 3–24. ...
Cited by 271 Related articles All 26 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
Self‐locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
A Elga - Analysis, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
... In his Philosophical Papers, Volume I, 133–159. New York: Oxford University Press. Piccione,
M. and A. Rubenstein. 1997. On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall.
Games and Economic Behavior 20: 3–24. Quine, WV 1960. Word and Object. ...
M. and A. Rubenstein. 1997. On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall.
Games and Economic Behavior 20: 3–24. Quine, WV 1960. Word and Object. ...
Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
P Battigalli - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
... Econometrica, 52 (1984), pp. 1029–1050. Full Text via CrossRef. 14; M. Piccione, A. Rubinstein;
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall. Games Econ. Behav., 14 (1995).
15; A. Rubinstein; Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory. ...
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall. Games Econ. Behav., 14 (1995).
15; A. Rubinstein; Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory. ...
Cited by 26 Related articles All 11 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice
F Gul, W Pesendorfer - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004 - Elsevier
... Review of Economic Studies, 35 (1968), pp. 185–199. Full Text via CrossRef. Piccione and
Rubinstein, 1997; M. Piccione, A. Rubinstein; On the interpretation of decision problems with
imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20 (1) (1997), pp. 3–24. ...
Rubinstein, 1997; M. Piccione, A. Rubinstein; On the interpretation of decision problems with
imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20 (1) (1997), pp. 3–24. ...
Cited by 119 Related articles All 21 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
Extensive and strategic forms: Games and models for games
R Stalnaker - Research in Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
... 7; M. Piccione, A. Rubinstein; On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect
recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20 ((1997)), pp. 3–24. ...
recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20 ((1997)), pp. 3–24. ...
Cited by 64 Related articles All 6 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
Dynamic interactive epistemology
O Board - Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 - Elsevier
The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide
foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of th.
foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of th.
Cited by 134 Related articles All 14 versions Cite SaveSaving...Error saving. Try again? More EBSCOhost Full Text Fewer
On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
JY Halpern - Proceedings of the 6th conference on Theoretical …, 1996 - dl.acm.org
Page 1. On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees Joseph Y. Halpem IBM
Research Division Almaden Research Center, Dept. K53-B2 650 Harry Road San
Jose, CA 95120--6099 halpem@ almaden.ibm.com Abstract ...
Research Division Almaden Research Center, Dept. K53-B2 650 Harry Road San
Jose, CA 95120--6099 halpem@ almaden.ibm.com Abstract ...
