Abstract In psychological games the payoff to each player depends not only on what every
player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what he thinks they
believe others believe, and so on. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to ...

... MIT Press (1991). Geanakoplos et al., 1989; J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti;
Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games Econ. Behav., 1 (1989), pp. ... The
one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality. Games Econ. Behav., 12 (1996), pp. 152– ...

We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with
sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for
extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to ...

In an extensive form game, a strategy profile is a sequential equilibrium if there are
consistent beliefs at all information sets which, with the strategy profile, are sequentially
rational at every information set. Along the equilibrium path, consistent beliefs are ...

... on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti
[J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti, Psychological games and sequential
rationality, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 60–79] point out ...

Abstract We show that an individual using a choice function is sequentially rational and the
decisions he makes are independent of the order of implementation of the rationales if and
only if he is rational with the union of the rationales as a base binary relation. When he ...

Abstract Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic
properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-
bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of ...

... equilibrium as our solution concept. This choice is moti- vated by the need to combine
two properties in the solution concept. One is the property of sequential rationality,
as described by sequential equilibrium. The second is that we ...

... 1065–1090. 6; D. Fudenberg, DK Levine; Measuning subject's losses in experimental games.
Quart. J. Econom., 112 (1997), pp. 508–536. 7; J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti;
Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games Econom. Behav., 1 (1989), pp. 60–79. ...

... extensive games. The force of this criterion stems from the stringent requirement of
sequential rationality imposed on the behavior of every player: Every decision must
be part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the game. In ...