Abstract Bayesian reasoning has been applied formally to statistical inference, machine
learning and analysing scientific method. Here I apply it informally to more common forms of
inference, namely natural language arguments. I analyse a variety of traditional fallacies, ...

... Informal Logic 22 (2). Ralph Johnson (2011). The Coherence of Hamblin's Fallacies. Informal
Logic 31 (4):305-317. Kevin Korb (2004). Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy. Informal Logic
24 (1):41-70. Howard Kahane (forthcoming). The Nature and Classification of Fallacies. ...

... Bayes or bust? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eisenberg, AR, Garvey, C. (1981). ... A normative
theory of argument strength: Why do we want one and why do we want it to be Bayesian?
Informal Logic, 26, 1-24. Hahn, U., Oaksford, M., Bayindir, H. (2005). ...

... Cognitive Science 40 (1):n/an/a. Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach
to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207 - 236. ... Lawrence H. Powers (1995). The
One Fallacy Theory. Informal Logic 17 (2). Jonathan Harrison (1995). ...

... A popular response to the problem has been that informal logic deals with arguments in context ...
We argue that Bayes- ian inference can provide a useful account of the epistemic adequacy ...
adequacy of an argument, factors that are also directly relevant to our Bayesian approach ...

... Many textbooks on informal logic and critical thinking treat the slippery slope argument as a fallacy. ...
Add more references Citations of this work BETA. Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian
Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207 - 236. ...

... However, source considerations have not really figured in non-classical logical approaches to
argumentation either (though for some informal considerations see Walton, 2008). ... As noted above,
at the heart of the Bayesian approach is Bayes' Theorem—a normative ...

... 5 The Rebuttal Factor Method vs the Bayesian Method 148 7 An Inductive Argument Typology
1 5 1 7.1 Argument-Pattern Typologies 152 7.1.1 The Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ... 8 Informal
Logic 3 S believes that H will accept P as providing adequate logical sup- port ...

... We describe our approach to the argument from ignorance as “Bayesian” not only
because we use Bayes' rule. ... There has been one other attempt, to our knowledge,
to offer a Bayesian justification for an informal reasoning fallacy. ...

... of the test and the prior belief that T is true (P(T)) using Bayes' theorem ... In Hahn, Oaksford and
Bayindir (2005) the Bayesian account is extended to a treatment of circular ... This treatment of
informal argument fallacies complements earlier research by Oaksford and Chater that has ...